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SUPPRESSION OF OVARIA)[ FUNCTION TO
PREVENT METASTASIS
Is oophorectomy permissible in
the case of a married woman of
child-bearing age to prevent metastasis from carcinoma of the breast?
Also, is the suppression of ovarian
function by irradiation permissible
for the same purpose?

P rinciple
The general principle governing all treatments and operations
that interfere with bodily integrity
was clearly stated by Pius XI in
the Encyclical on Christian Marriage. After condemning the theory
of eugenic steriliza tion and insisting that the state has no power
over the bodies of innocent persons , the Pope went on to explain
the limited right that the individuals have over the members of
their own bodies:
"Furthermore." he said. "Christian doctrine establishes. and the
light of human reason makes it
most clear. that private individuals
have no other power over the members of their bodies than that
which pertains to their natural
ends; and they are not free to
destroy or mutilate their members .
or in any other way render them selves unfit for their natural functions. except when no other provision can be made for the good of
the whole body." (Encyclical on
Marriage, America Press Edition .
pp.21-22).
As his words indicate. the Pope
was not enunciating a new doctrine; he was simply restating a
principle long known and defended
by Catholic moralists as a part of
the natural law. Since this principle will be used. not only in answering the present questions. but
also in solving ma ny other medico-

moral problems. it may be helpful
to note here some of the points
brought out by theologians when
they explain the principle.

Sacrifice of an O rgan for Good
of Body
In general. theologians speak of
three cases in which an individual
may licitly sacrifice an organ or a
function for the good of the whole
body. For example. if one's foot
is diseased and the disease cannot
be cured by treatment. one may
have it amputated to prevent the
disease from spreading to the rest
of the body. Again . if one's perfectly healthy foot is caught in a
railroad track. one may cut off the
foot in order to avoid being killed
by the train. Finally , if one's
enemy would point a gun at his
head , with the threat, "Cut off
your foot , or I'll blow your brains
out," the helpless victim could
licitly sacrifice the foot to preserve
his life.
The third case may sound fantastic (although . as a matter of
fact it has been verified more than
once in our modern "refined" civilization) , but both it and the second
case illustrate a point to be kept
in mind in this discussion: namely .
that to justify a mutilation it is not
always necessary that the organ or
function be .. diseased" in the technical sense; it suffices if the organ
or function is a real source of harm
to the body and the excision or
suppression would benefit the body
by removing the source of harm.
In all the examples cited the
organ was sacrificed in order to
ward off the danger of death .
These were merely examples. It
is not necessary that there be dan-
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ger of death in order to justify a
mutilation. For instance. theologians would generally admit. 1
think. that a man could cut off a
hand or foot in order to escape
from a long and unjust imprisonment. Similarly. a mutilating operation is permissible in order to remove a source of great pain or a
condition which incapacitates a
person. even though it does not
endanger his life.

Statement of the Holy Father
The Pope said that mutilation is
permissible only when "no other
provision can be made for the good
of the whole body." Do these
words mean that therapeutic treatment must always be preferred to
surgery? I doubt if they need to
be interpreted so absolutely. Certainly they do mean that a convenient and effective treatment
must be used in preference to
mutilation; but there is room for
discussion. I believe. regarding
cases in which the only available
treatments would be doubtfully effective or when a treatment could
be employed only with great inconvenience to the patient.
A good working rule regarding
the preference of mutilation (by
surgery or X-rays) over treatment
might be stated thus: good medicine is good morality. This rule
might or might not admit of occasional exceptions according to what
some might consider "good medicine"; but in general. if medical
authorities agree that mutilation is
the advisable course. the mutilation
may be considered as morally justifiable. If the authorities disagree.
and both sides offer sound arguments. the patient (or the patient's
physician) is entitled to solve the
doubt in his favor and to permit or
request the mutilation.
This point concerning the preference of mutilation over treatment
will very likely come up again in

this column when we consider certain definite procedures. What has
been said will suffice for the present. And to square my explanation with the Pope's statement, I
might paraphrase his words thus:
mutilation is permissible when there
is no other reasonably available
means that would be equally beneficial to the whole body.

Application to Reproductive
Organs
The preceding remarks concerning the licitness of mutilation apply -also to the mutilation of the
reproductive organs. provided the
operation or treatment is not
directly contraceptive. 1 can explain this limitation more clearly
by examples than by theoretical
discussion. As we all know. the
removal of a cancerous uterus or
of cancerous ovaries is permissible,
even though the operation inevitably results in sterility. In such
cases, the patient's life is saved .
not by the loss of fertility, but by
the removal of a diseased condition. This is obvious from the fact
that a mere sterilization (e.g. by
fallotomy) would not produce the
desired result.
On the other hand. when the
reproductive organs themselves are
neither diseased nor a source of
harm to the body. they may not
be mutilated merely to prevent a
pregnancy which would be dangerous by reason of some other
physical condition such as a weak
heart. An operation of this kind
is directly contraceptive: it produces its_ good effect precisely by
inducing sterility.
Why do Catholic theologians
insist on this distinction? Because
they hold firmly to the principle
that God has given to private individuals "no other power over the
members of their bodies than that
which pertains to their natural
ends." The reproductive function.
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as such. is not subordinated to the
individual's well-being; hence an
operation or treatment which is
immediately directed to a suppression of this function is contrary to
the purpose of the faculty. and is
therefore not in accord with sound
moral principles. On the other
hand . when the loss of fertility is
merely the indirect result of a
treatment or operation . it may be
permitted for a proportionate reason. just as other unwanted but
inevitable evil effects may sometimes be permitted (e.g. the death
of the fetus when a cancerous
pregnant uterus must be removed) .
Conclusion
We can now apply the principle
to the questions proposed .
According to a theory to which
many eminent medical authorities
subscribe. ovarian secretion. especially follicular hormone . stimulates
the growth of neoplastic tissue.
Hence the ovaries. though not
technically " diseased." are a real
source of harm to the woman
afflicted with carcinoma of the
breast; and the removal of the
ovaries tends to benefit the whole
body by diminishing or eliminating
the danger of metastasis. This
good effect cannot be produced
without at the same time rendering
the woman sterile; but it is not
precisely by steriliza tion tha t the
good is accomplished. The desired
good . if accomplished at all. is
brought about by a suppression of
the endocrine function of the ovaries ; and a mere sterilization (such
as fallotomy) would not serve the
purpose. The sterility. therefore .
which is induced in the present
cases is indirect and not contraceptive.
As I understand the matter.
there is some controversy among
medical men concerning the value
of oophorectomy or irradiation of
the ovaries for the prevention of
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metastasis. But the theory that
supports it seems to be wellfounded and solidly probable;
hence the patient or the patient's
physician may resort to the operation or the irradiation , provided
there is no equally effective but
less drastic procedure available.
I have on hand two Hospital
Codes. recently published with
ecclesiastical approval. both of
which allow oophorectomy or irradiation of the ovaries for the
prevention of metastasis. The one
condition they lay down is that
the hospital may demand consultation. In other words, according to
these codes, if prudent medical
judgment considers either procedure (surgery or X-rays) advisable, it is also · morally justifiable.
I think that expresses our conclusion very neatly.
References
The standard moral theology
texts do not. as far as I know ,
treat the present topic. In general.
the authors cited in the sub-joined
references seem to admit that the
destruction of the ovaries is permissible if required to cure or impede the growth of cancer. Some,
however, question the utility or
necessity.
The Linacre Quarterly, X (January. 1942) 4-5. In an article
entitled" Steriliza tion ," Father
John Ford, S.J. , allows the destruction of the ovaries when this is
necessary " in order to cure cancer
of the breast, or to cure other
malignant growths - or at least
diminish such growths." He insists . however, that in procedures
that result in sterility there be no
contraceptive intent.
The Ecclesiastical Review, CVIII
(April. 1943) 271-73. Writing
about irradiation of ovaries in cancer of the breasts, Father Peter
Kremer, O.S . Cam . , shows that
the sterility induced by this treat -

:10

TI-I E LI NAC' R E Q llA H'l'E ItL Y

ment is only indirect. It is not
clear to me tha t he is actually defending th e treatment a s permissible. but he seems to imply it. He
concludes with the s tatement that
"all cancers of the breast are likely
to grow slower a nd spread less
ra pidly if not affected by ovarian
secretion. than if this secretion
were present. "

Th e Ecclesiastical R evie w, CIX
(Augu st. 1943) . 125-27. Writing
on " The Moralit y of Indirect
Sterili za tion ." F a ther Honoratus
Bonzelet. O .F.M .. a dmits that the
irradiation of the ova ries for the
cure of cancer of the breast w ould
be a n indirect steriliza tion . but he
ex presses his opinion th a t it would
be illicit in the cases referred to by
F a ther Kr e mer b e c a us e there
would not be a proportiona te reason for it. I am not sure that
Father Bonzelet touches th e point
a t issue in the question s proposed
to me. He seems to be thinking

only in terms of curing the primary cancer of the breast by means
of suppressing ovaria n secretion .
and not of preventing metastasis .
He cites a Mayo authority to the
effect that the procedure of choice
would be removal of the breast
carcinoma follow ed by roentgen
therapy of the excised area .
Theological Studies, IV (December. 1943). 588-89. In reviewing the articles written by Fathers
Kremer and Bonzelet. Father John
Ford. S . J .. agrees with Father
Bonzelet that there must be a proportionate reason for indirect sterilization. but he believes that the
judgment of this rea son is chiefly
a medical one.
Medical Ethics [or Nurses, by
C ha rles J. McFadden . O .S .A ..
Philadelphia , F . A. Davis Co ..
1946. See pp. 224-25 . Father McF a dden says practica lly the same
as Father Bonzelet. a s referred to
above .

ORCHIDE CTOl\IY FOR CAItCIN OMA
OF PHOSTATE
Question : Is it permiss ible [or a
doctor to perform an orchidectomy ,
primarily [or the relief of pain , on
a patient who has carcin oma o[ the
prostate gland?

Previous D iscussion
Th e problem pres ented here is
quite similar to the question concerning the suppression of ovarian
function in cases of carcinoma of
the breast, a question that was dis cussed in Ho s pital Progre ss ,
XXIX (April . 1948) . 147-48 .
It was pointed out in that discussion that a treatment or mutila tion of the reproductive organs
which results in sterility is morally
justifiable only wh en these condi-

tions are fulfilled : (I) the purpose
of the treatment or opera tion must
not be contraceptive ; (2) the procedure must offer some hope of
benefit to a patient who suffers
from serious pathology; and (3) a
less drastic procedure which offers
more or less equal hope of benefit
is not reasona bly available.
In the article referred to . I indicated how these three conditions
might be fulfilled in the case of
oophorectomy or irradiation of the
ovaries for the prevention of metastasis from carcinoma of the
breast. First, these procedures are
not precisely contraceptive measures , beca use they are directed to
the suppression of the endocrine.

